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Abstract In recent years commercial banks have moved toward automated
forms of underwriting. This study employs unique bank loan-
level data from a scoring lender to determine whether automated
underwriting exhibits a potential ‘‘disparate impact’’ across
income strata. The ﬁndings indicate that strict application of this
custom scoring model leads to higher denial rates for low- to
moderate-income borrowers when compared with both a naı ¨ve
judgmental system and a bureau scoring approach. These results
suggest that ﬁnancial regulators should focus more resources on
the evaluation and study of customized scoring models.
Introduction
Statistically-based credit decision-making systems were pioneered during the late
1950s but only became commonplace during the 1990s.1 These statistically-based
techniques are commonly referred to as ‘‘credit scoring’’ models.2 In recent years
the use of credit scoring models has become widespread in the mortgage lending
industry.3 In addition to its use in the underwriting process, credit scoring is also
employed by secondary market purchasers of mortgage loans, including the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), and by providers of private mortgage
insurance. For example, two GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) issued advisory
letters in 1995 encouraging mortgage originators to consider credit scores from
the major credit bureaus in their underwriting decisions (Fannie Mae, 1995;
Freddie Mac, 1995). In addition, the three national credit bureaus have developed
scoring systems designed speciﬁcally for the mortgage market.
Proponents of credit scoring and of the ‘‘automated underwriting’’ process that
beneﬁts from scoring’s employment, argue that it lowers the overall cost of making
credit available to consumers, while simultaneously increasing the speed and
objectivity of underwriting decisions.4 Detractors of credit scoring models argue,130  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
however, that the underwriting variables employed and the weights assigned to
each variable are based on the payment performance of traditional consumers.5
As such, scores generated by these models may not accurately portray the
creditworthiness of underrepresented groups in the applicant pool, such as low-
income and minority applicants. In particular, scoring models typically omit
certain nontraditional indicators of credit performance, such as rent and utility
payment histories, which are important components of credit performance for
many low-income applicants.6
A primary conjecture of this study is that custom credit scoring systems yield a
disparity in low-income denials relative to upper income denials, since these
scoring systems neglect compensating factors, or creditworthiness-related
attributes, that are more common for low-income applicants.7 Speciﬁcally, the
following hypothesis is tested:
H0: Judgmental systems reduce the denial disparity between low-income
and upper-income applicants over a custom credit scoring system,
ceteris paribus.8
Unique data on unsecured home-improvement loans from a large lender, using an
overlay system of both custom and credit bureau scores, is employed in the
underwriting process to test whether the use of credit scoring models has a
‘‘disparate impact’’ on low-to-moderate income (LMI) applicants. Thus, these data
provide a unique opportunity for examining the effects of several possible
underwriting scenarios on applicant outcomes. The use of a customized scoring
model results in a signiﬁcantly higher disparity in denial frequencies between
applicant income segments as compared with a machine-replicated ‘‘judgmental’’
model or when compared with a decision model based solely on generic credit
bureau scores. The results suggest that medium- and upper-income applicants
beneﬁt disproportionately from implementation of this single custom scoring
model, and that inclusion of alternative creditworthiness variables for LMI
applicants reduces the disparate impact of credit scoring.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. The next section describes the
credit scoring process and provides the theoretical underpinnings. The following
section describes the data sources, provides descriptive statistics and details the
empirical methods. The next section provides the results of comparisons of the
outcomes for the ‘‘judgmental’’ model with those of the credit scoring models to
assess whether credit scoring has a disparate impact on LMI applicants. The
section also identiﬁes the variables in the custom scoring model that appear to
drive the denial rate disparities.9 The ﬁnal section is the conclusion.
 Credit Scoring Process, Types and Potential Disparate
Impact
Credit scores are statistically derived measures of creditworthiness that rank order
credit applicants according to their degree of credit or default risk.10 A score isThe Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  131
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typically associated with an odds–ratio, addressing the question: How many
applicants are likely to exhibit payment streams that become delinquent (or
default) at the corresponding score? Although the models do not predict the
absolute level of risk nor which borrowers within a score range are likely to
perform poorly, the literature has shown them to be effective tools for rank-
ordering the risk of applicants (see Avery, Bostic, Calem and Canner, 1996;
Freddie Mac, 1996; and Pierzchalski, 1996). For example, Avery et al. (1996) ﬁnd
that borrowers in the lowest of three credit score groupings comprised only 2%
of seasoned, conventional ﬁxed-rate mortgages, but represented 32% of those that
became delinquent.
Scoring systems are typically implemented in three ways. In the ﬁrst approach,
banks employ scoring models to eliminate the tails of the credit distribution from
further consideration. In this scenario, borrowers with very high scores are
approved immediately, those with the lowest scores are rejected immediately, and
the remaining applicants in the middle of the distribution, so called ‘‘marginal’’
applicants, are underwritten judgmentally.11 In the second approach, the bank
relies solely on the score in choosing whether to underwrite the credit
application.12 The latter method is more common at commercial banks, reasoning
that this approach minimizes the possibility of disparate-treatment
issues—particularly for marginal applicants.13 As deﬁned by the courts, disparate
treatment occurs when similarly situated persons are treated differently on the
basis of race.14 Disparate impact is another form of discrimination recognized by
the courts. Disparate impact occurs when a policy has a disproportionate adverse
impact on applicants from a protected group, unless this guideline or policy can
be justiﬁed as a business necessity that cannot reasonably be achieved as well by
means that have less of an impact on the protected class. This is an important
area of discrimination that lenders must consider when designing scoring models
since certain variables may be found to have a disparate impact on protected
applicants.
Finally, scores are often employed as one of several critical elements in the
underwriting process for complex loans. For example, banks typically will pull
mortgage scores when underwriting these large loans and use this information in
addition to several other critical variables, such as debt-to-income ratios, major
delinquencies and previous bankruptcies.
Application (custom) scorecards and credit bureau scorecards are the two most
common types of scoring tools employed in screening credit applicants. There are
two important distinctions between these two types of scoring tools. The ﬁrst
distinction is that credit bureau scorecards consider information related to an
applicant’s experience with debt repayment. These scorecards do not consider the
non-credit-related characteristics of the applicant, such as income and employment
history, included in a mortgage or home improvement credit application.
Application, or custom, scorecards employ both the credit bureau information and
information on these additional characteristics of the applicant. The second
distinction between these two scoring approaches is that application scorecards132  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
are typically based on the historical performance of the bank’s approved
applicants,15 while credit bureau scores are built off national samples that are less
speciﬁc to the bank’s applicant population.16 Thus, given the differing scope and
purposes of these two scoring tools, the techniques may lead to different
underwriting decisions.
Previous literature assessing the inﬂuence of credit scoring in the underwriting
process is sparse and focuses primarily on the role of bureau scores in that process.
For example, Avery, Bostic, Calem and Canner (2000) examine several statistical
issues related to credit scoring, using aggregate data, and show that omitted
variables in the construction and use of bureau scores can create two problems.
First, Avery et al. argue that the omission of valid predictors of creditworthiness
can create inappropriate rank orderings of likely default or delinquency. Second,
they argue that failure to develop a bureau scoring model using a population
representative of the target population can compromise the model’s effectiveness.
Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd signiﬁcant variation in bureau scores across a number of
economic, geographic and demographic groups, suggesting that the omitted
variables and under-representation issues warrant further attention.
This paper extends the Avery et al. (2000) research by examining the loan-level
data and underwriting decisions of a bank employing a custom scoring model.
The underwriting decisions derived from customized, credit bureau, and machine-
replicated judgmental approaches are evaluated to demonstrate how these
outcomes vary by income group.17 The ﬁndings indicate that the custom-scorecard
decisions lead to even larger disparities in high income versus LMI denial rates
than those disparities created using either the credit bureau score or the machine-
replicated ‘‘judgmental’’ model approach. These results suggest that the issues of
both omitted variable bias and the under-representation of certain sub-populations
(e.g., LMI) in model development may be even greater for some customized
models.18
The concerns associated with the application of scoring models to low-income
applicants can be formalized in a simple theoretical and graphical framework.
Ferguson and Peters (1995) develop a model of credit underwriting. Their results
show that differences in credit quality across applicant groups result in unequal
denial rates when a single credit score is applied uniformly to all applicants.
Building on the work of Ferguson and Peters, this study examines the impact of
the omission of variables from the scoring model that are important in assessing
the credit quality of a particular group. A setting is considered in which the credit
score, , is the sole criteria lenders use to render a credit decision. This score is ˆ 
derived by observing a vector of applicant characteristics, 1, which the lender’s X
experience indicates are correlated with the probability of loan repayment. The
‘true’ creditworthiness of each applicant is given by . Consistent with existing
empirical evidence, it is assumed that assumed that there is a signiﬁcant difference
in the average  for the upper income and LMI applicant groups. Let the ‘true’
probability of loan repayment for the upper-income group adhere to a normal
probability density function (PDF), u(), and that the LMI group have normalThe Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  133
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Exhibit 1  Applicant Approvals
 l(θ  )   u(θ  ) 
θ
*    θ l      θ u     θ  
PDF l(). Thus, the mean ‘true’ creditworthiness for the upper income and LMI
groups are u and l, respectively, where u  l.
Lenders establish a minimum credit score, *, based on their risk preferences and
tolerances such that applicants with  * are denied credit. As Exhibit 1 ˆ 
demonstrates, since u  l, the frequency of LMI applicant approvals is less than
the frequency of upper-income applicant approvals: l()d()  u()d().   *  * 
The problem of omitted variables bias in the creation of credit scores arises when
the vector of applicant characteristics considered by the lender, , omits certain X
variables that are important determinants of true creditworthiness and when the
omitted variables reveal more information regarding the creditworthiness of one
class of borrowers over another. Consider the case where the correlation of the
omitted variables with  is systematically related to applicant income. In particular,
assume that lenders use the same vector of characteristics, , when estimating  X1
for both applicant groups. Moreover, excludes certain variables that are X1
important predictors of  for LMI applicants, such as rent and utility payments,
which are included in a second vector of characteristics, . Assume also that the X2
variables in reveal less information for upper income applicants than for LMI X2
applicants since the variability in performance for these types of obligations is
likely much lower in the upper income group. Thus, the credit score for all
applicants is estimated as:
ˆˆ   X   , (1) 11134  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
Exhibit 2  Credit Worthiness
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while true creditworthiness for LMI applicants is:
  X   X   . (2) L 11 22
For the LMI applicant group, suffers from the familiar omitted variables bias, ˆ 
since Equation (1) excludes the variables in and increases the weights of the X2
elements of , for which LMI applicants exhibit lower quality than upper-income X1
applicants. As such, the credit score based on provides a biased estimate of  X1
for the LMI group, such that L  . Letting the variable  represent this bias ˆ 
(  L  ), the omitted variables bias effectively raises the credit standard for ˆ 
LMI applicants to *  . The result is a reduction in the frequency of LMI
applicant approvals to: thereby increasing the disparity in approval   * l()d(), 
rates between LMI and upper-income applicants by . Marginal LMI applicants
with *    *   are denied credit, while upper-income applicants with the
same overall credit worthiness are accepted. This result is depicted in Exhibit 2.
LMI applicants with high levels of suffer the most from the error in estimating X2
.
 Data Description and Empirical Methods
This study analyzes 1996 data on 2,266 unsecured, home-improvement loan
applications drawn from a large regional lender’s activities in a single MSA. As
such, the pool of credits is relatively homogeneous and the underwriting standardsThe Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  135
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Exhibit 3  Unsecured Home Improvement Application Sample for 1996
Classiﬁcation No. of Applications Fraction of Sample (%)
All income groups 2,266 100
LMI group 1,698 74.9
Upper-income group 568 25.1
Notes: Description of the unsecured home improvement application sample for 1996. The table
contains both the overall sample description across income groups and the break out of the sample
by LMI and upper-income applicants. The 1996 HUD median income for the applicants MSA was
used to create the bifurcation.
relatively stable across time. The application-level data also include information
on the income from the application, the bureau and customized credit scores, and
the score attributes, or individual score loadings, for all applicants. Low- to
moderate-income individuals are deﬁned as those with incomes below the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 1996 MSA median income for
this geography, while upper income are deﬁned as those with incomes at or above
the MSA median income.19
Descriptive Statistics
Exhibit 3 contains the breakdown of the 2,266 applications by income group.
There are 1,698 applications from LMI applicants, accounting for 74.9% of the
sample and 568 applications from upper-income applicants, accounting for 25.1%
of the sample. As such, the sample has a reasonable balance and sufﬁcient
representation for both groups to perform hypothesis testing.20 Exhibit 4 describes
the data overall, and then stratiﬁed by income group. From the mean difference
test on application income, it can be seen that LMI applicants have signiﬁcantly
lower incomes than upper-income applicants ($23,176 vs. $81,267), as expected.
The mean difference tests for credit bureau scores and for custom credit scores
are more revealing, however, as LMI applicants overall have signiﬁcantly lower
credit scores relative to upper-income applicants for both the custom (189 vs. 218)
and bureau (661 vs. 678) score measures.21 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for
differences in the second and higher moments of these two distributions show that
the credit bureau score distribution for lower-income applicants is signiﬁcantly
different from the distribution of scores for upper-income applicants. This
characteristic holds true for the custom credit score and income distributions, as
well.
Exhibit 4 also provides the difference of means tests and distributional
comparisons for the individual attributes, or factor loadings, of the custom
scorecard. These attributes include: time at current address, number of bank trade136  Collins, Harvey and Nigro








Applicant income $23,176 $81,267 34.1*** 20.6***
Credit bureau score 661.3 678.1 4.4*** 2.6***
Custom credit score 189.8 218.7 14.3*** 6.7***
Custom Score Factors
Time at current address (months) 175.2 98.8 8.5*** 4.7***
No. of bank trade lines 1.5 1.8 4.1*** 1.8***
No. of ﬁnance company inquiries 1.3 1.1 0.0 0.4
No. of overall inquiries 2.9 2.9 0.5 0.5
No. times 30-60 days late 1.5 1.0 5.6*** 2.5***
Applicant income (monthly) $1,931 $6,772 35.7*** 20.6***
No. of Trade lines opened in 1 year 2.1 2.6 4.8*** 1.9***
Revolving credit limit $14,208 $31,855 17.5*** 7.8***
No. of satisfactory trade lines 10.7 18.8 18.6*** 8.0***
Age of trade ﬁle in months 184.3 186.1 2.7*** 3.1***
Notes: Panel statistics for differences between LMI and upper-income groups in 1996. The table
contains the averages for the LMI group and the upper-income group, plus the Wilcoxon 2-sample
test for differences across income groups and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distributional
differences across income groups. The 1996 HUD median income was used to create the bifurcation.
* Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
lines, ﬁnance company credit inquiries, overall credit inquiries, number of times
30–60 days late, applicant income, trade lines opened in less than 1 year, highest
revolving credit limit, number of satisfactory credits and age of the credit bureau
trade ﬁle in months. The two groups, LMI and upper income, reveal signiﬁcant
statistical differences across each of these attributes except ﬁnance company credit
inquiries and overall credit inquiries. The only scorecard attribute on which LMI
applicants fare better is time at current address. This longer stay in residence may
indicate a lack of upward mobility by these applicants, providing some evidence
that risk characteristics may not be the same across income strata.
Exhibit 5 contains the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients for the credit bureau score,
custom credit score and the variables included in the custom scoring model. Not
surprisingly, there is a relatively high level of correlation among many of the


































































































Credit bureau 1 0.69 0.16 0.23 0.46 0.49 0.30 0.23 0.35 0.33 0.64 0.36
score 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Custom credit 1 0.16 0.16 0.34 0.31 0.53 0.09 0.13 0.26 0.70 0.28551
score 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Time at current 1 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.55
address 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2378 0.0001 0.0001 0.9475 0.0206 0.0001
No. of bank 1 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.30 0.09 0.29
trade lines 0.0001 0.0424 0.5417 0.0026 0.0051 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
No. of ﬁn. 1 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.28 0.06 0.20 0.12
co. inq. 0.0001 0.0001 0.8264 0.0001 0.0086 0.0001 0.0001
No. of overall 1 0.11 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.16 0.16
inq. 0.0001 0.6678 0.0001 0.4899 0.0001 0.0001
No. times 30– 1 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.61 0.05
60 days late 0.8496 0.8682 0.0142 0.0001 0.0307
Applicant 1 0.09 0.31 0.08 0.01
income 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.7971




Revolving 1 0.22 0.25
credit limit 0.0001 0.0001





Note: Pearson correlation coefﬁcients for credit bureau score, custom credit score and the variables included in the custom scoring model.138  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
Exhibit 6  2x2 Matrix of Outcomes for All Applications
Income Class Approved % Approved Denied % Denied Total
Panel A: Actual Outcomes
LMI 890 52.41a 808 47.59a 1,698
Upper income 431 75.88a 137 24.12a 568
Total 1,321 58.30 945 41.70 2,266
Panel B: Credit Bureau Score Outcomes
LMI 942 55.48b 756 44.52b 1,698
Upper income 380 66.90b 188 33.10b 568
Total 1,322 58.34 944 41.66 2,266
Panel C: Custom Score Outcomes
LMI 856 50.41c 842 49.59c 1,698
Upper income 461 81.16c 107 18.84c 568
Total 1,317 58.12 949 41.88 2,266
Notes: 2x2 Matrix of outcomes for all 2,266 applications. Panel A contains the actual outcomes by
income class for the population of 2,266 applications; denial rate disparity (low vs. high) 23.47%.
Panel B contains the matrix of outcomes by income class, using the credit bureau cutoff score of 651
and a denial rate of 41.70% as the sole criteria for determining approval or denial; denial rate
disparity (low vs. high) 11.42%. Panel C contains the matrix of outcomes by income class, using the
custom credit score of 191 and a denial rate of 41.70% as the sole criteria for determining approval
or denial; denial rate disparity (low vs. high) 30.75%. The row percentages appear to the right of
each cell. The cumulative counts for each row appear as the right-most ﬁgures, while the cumulative
counts for each column appear in the bottom row.
aThe Chi-square statistics for the difference in the two proportions across groups is 96.40 and
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
bThe Chi-square statistic for the difference in the two proportions across groups is 22.86 and
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
cThe Chi-square statistic for the difference in the two proportions across groups is 165.34 and
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
three different ways: actual outcomes, credit bureau-scored outcomes and custom-
scored outcomes. Panel A reveals the breakdown of actual outcomes into approvals
and denials, by income group as rendered by the lender. Of 1,698 LMI applicants,
890 were approved, representing an approval rate of 52.41%. Of 568 upper-income
applicants, 431 were approved, resulting in an approval rate of 75.88%. The
difference between these two approval rates, representing a disparity of 23.47%
in favor of upper-income applicants, is statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% level
(Chi-square statistic of 96.40).The Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  139
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Panel B of Exhibit 6 details the approval and denial breakdown scenario should
the applicants have been judged solely on the merits of the credit bureau score,
using the cutoff score of 651 to create a denial rate for the group, which is identical
to the overall actual denial rate for the sample, 41.7%. In this instance, the
disparity in denial rates narrows from the original case of 23.47% to a disparity
of 11.4%. This difference in proportions between the two groups is, however, still
signiﬁcant at the 99% level.
The ﬁnal panel of Exhibit 6, Panel C, contains the approval and denial breakdown
scenario should the applicants have been judged solely on the merits of the custom
score, using the cutoff score of 191 to recreate the overall actual denial rate of
41.7% in the sample. In this instance, the difference in denial rates between LMI
and upper-income applicants widens relative to the two previously calculated
disparities. In fact, the LMI and upper income denial rates are 49.59% and
18.84%, respectively. This difference is more than 30 percentage points and
represents the widest disparity among these underwriting scenarios.
To recap, the results from Exhibit 6 show that the actual bank decisions strike a
middle ground between the decisions dictated by the strict application of a custom
credit score and the strict application of a credit bureau score. The most noticeable
result, however, is the lower disparity that emerges through the strict application
of the credit bureau score. This result may reﬂect the fact that credit bureaus do
not have similar information sets relative to the banks (e.g., income, time at
address) or alternatively, credit bureaus may be more concerned with disparate
impact issues.22 This is an important ﬁnding since community groups have often
criticized the use of generic bureau scores, claiming they result in a bias against
accepting LMI and minority applicants.
Empirical Methods
To assess the beneﬁt of adding nontraditional credit information either to the credit
bureau score approach or to the custom credit score approach, a three-step process
is used for hypothesis testing. First, using the entire dataset, two separate logistic
regression models are created—a machine-replicated ‘‘judgmental’’ model and a
custom score model. The judgmental underwriting model employs the factors that
a typical judgmental underwriter considers in making a credit determination,
including the bureau score, the number of major derogatories, the number of minor
derogatories and whether a prior relationship existed with this lender. As a result,
this judgmental model compliments the generic credit bureau score with a typical
list of bank-speciﬁc factors an underwriter may employ in gauging the likelihood
of loan repayment for a particular applicant. The simplest form of the logit model
is:
p
ln     * X, (3)  1  p140  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
where represents a vector of n coefﬁcients and where X represents a 4  n 
matrix of credit characteristics as previously described. The resulting applicant-
level probabilities of approval are used to ‘‘score’’ the applications based on the
lender’s denial rate of 41.7%. The outcomes from the judgmental system are
classiﬁed in the same manner as the custom-scored model. The custom score
approach uses solely the attributes of the custom scoring model. The denial
disparity rates are compared across these two underwriting models for LMI vs.
upper-income individuals to determine which of these approaches offers the lower
disparity.
Since marginal applicants are most likely the ones impacted by changes in
underwriting techniques, a similar set of tests for a group of marginal applicants
is examined. These marginal applicants represent those that have either
characteristics or scores that are closer to the cutoff than the scores of the general
applicant population. Marginal applicants are applicants receiving an aggregate
custom score of between 195 and 210. This group includes 444 applicants, or
20% of the overall sample. After comparing the disparities across the two
underwriting approaches, three factors (the number of ﬁnance company inquiries,
length of credit history, and applicant income) are identiﬁed in the custom score
model that drive the denial rate disparity between LMI and upper-income
applicants in a custom scoring approach.23
 Results
Exhibit 7 contains the results for the judgmental underwriting model for the full
sample. The model includes factors that would appear in a judgmental review: (1)
a comprehensive measure of creditworthiness provided by the credit bureau score;
(2) the number of major credit delinquencies; (3) the number of minor credit
delinquencies; and (4) a binary variable for whether the borrower has a prior
relationship with this lender.
Panel A of Exhibit 7 contains the factor coefﬁcients derived from the logistic
regression, as well as the Chi-square statistics for signiﬁcance. The panel shows
that three of the four coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 99% level and with the
proper sign. The results indicate that having a prior relationship with the bank, a
higher bureau score and fewer major credit derogatories lowers the likelihood of
applicant denial. Panel B contains the summary statistics for this logistic
regression. The judgmental model has a concordance, or goodness of ﬁt, of 90.8%,
indicating that based on a probability of denial of 41.7%, the model outcomes
agree with the actual outcomes 90.8% of the time. Thus, the overall ﬁt of the
model is comparatively high and two of the three additional judgmental factors
in the model are highly signiﬁcant. Note that minor credit derogatories and major
credit derogatories are highly correlated, likely dampening their individual
inﬂuence in the regressions.The Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  141
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Exhibit 7  Judgmental Underwriting Model
Panel A: Coefﬁcients
Variable Parameter Estimate Wald Chi-Square
Intercept 17.74*** 316.21
Credit bureau score 0.03*** 337.68
Major derogatories 0.21*** 19.67
Minor derogatories 0.09** 5.31
Prior relationship 1.20*** 92.86
Panel B: Summary Statistics
Criteria Estimate
Akiake information criteria 1,721.24
2 log likelihood 1,711.24
Concordance (%) 90.8
Panel C: Judgmental Model Outcomes
Income Class Approved % Approved Denied % Denied Total
LMI 934 55.01a 764 44.99a 1,698
Upper income 386 67.96a 182 32.04a 568
Total 1,320 58.25 946 41.75 2,266
Notes: Judgmental underwriting model employing a logistic regression analysis on the full sample of
2266 unsecured, home improvement applications. The model in Panel A includes the following
factors: credit bureau score, major derogatories, minor derogatories and whether there was a prior
satisfactory relationship with the lender. Panel B contains the summary statistics for the model, and
Panel C contains a 2x2 matrix of judgmental outcomes by income class, using the denial rate of
41.70% as the cutoff for determining approval or denial; denial rate disparity (LMI vs. high) 12.95%.
The row percentages appear to the right of each cell. The cumulative counts for each row appear as
the right-most ﬁgures, and the cumulative counts for each column appear in the bottom row.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
aThe Chi-square statistic for the difference in the two proportions across groups is 4.730 and
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.142  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
Using the probability of approval derived from the judgmental model for each
applicant and the cutoff of 41.7%, each applicant is classiﬁed as either an approval
or a denial in Panel C of Exhibit 7, separating the applicants into two groups
based on income. The resulting disparity is 13.0%, substantially smaller than the
30.8% disparity presented in Exhibit 6, where the custom score was used as the
sole underwriting criteria.
Exhibit 8 contains the logistic regression results from using the ten factors from
the custom score underwriting model. When interpreting the factor coefﬁcients
shown in Panel A, remember that the variables are scorecard points so that all
attributes should have a negative sign. For example, the higher the Number of 30-
to-60 day late payments, the fewer the points the applicant receives on that
attribute and the higher the likelihood of denial. The only factor in the model that
is insigniﬁcant is Time at current address for which LMI applicants have higher
scores. The summary statistics in Panel B reveal that the model has a concordance,
or goodness of ﬁt, of 91.4%.
Panel C of Exhibit 8 contains the denial rate outcomes. For LMI applicants, there
are 814 denials, a denial rate of 47.9%. For upper-income applicants, there are
132 denials, a denial rate of 23.2%. The resulting denial disparity between these
two groups of 24.7% is roughly double the judgmental model disparity reported
in Exhibit 7.
In sum, both approaches—judgmental and scorecard—result in signiﬁcant
disparities between LMI and upper-income applicants. On further review, however,
the results show that the smaller of the two disparities is for the machine-replicated
judgmental credit underwriting approach, afﬁrming the null hypothesis that
judgmental systems reduce the denial disparity between low-income and upper-
income applicants over a custom credit scoring system, ceteris paribus.
As previously discussed, the merits of credit scoring are best examined by
reviewing marginal applicants. These are the applicants with credit scores that are
at or near the cutoff for denial. For the tests on the marginal sample, the
breakdown is shown across income groups in Exhibit 9. In this sub-sample of 444
applicants, there are 317 LMI applicants and 127 upper-income applicants. For
the LMI group, the actual denial percentage from the decision ﬁle is 23.7%, and
for the upper-income group, the denial percentage is 22.1%. As expected for the
marginal sample, these two proportions across income groups are not statistically
different at the weakest permissible statistical level of 90%.
Exhibit 10 provides the difference of means tests and distributional comparisons
for the custom and bureau scores for the 444 marginal applicants stratiﬁed by
LMI versus upper income. As expected, differences between these marginal LMI
and upper-income applicants are not as pronounced as those differences found for
the full sample. The two income groups, however, are ranked differently by the
two credit scoring methods. LMI marginal applicants have signiﬁcantly higher
credit bureau scores, but signiﬁcantly lower custom scores when compared with
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Exhibit 8  Custom Credit Score Model
Panel A: Coefﬁcients
Variable Parameter Estimate Wald Chi-Square
Intercept 10.82*** 254.68
No. of inquiries 0.07*** 61.89
Time at current address 0.01 0.012
No. of ﬁnance company inquiries 0.04*** 43.82
Applicant income 0.05*** 83.85
No. of satisfactory trade lines 0.05*** 91.00
No. times 30-60 days late 0.25*** 47.83
Revolving credit limit 0.03*** 21.09
No. of bank trade lines 0.42*** 41.09
No. of Trade lines opened in last year 0.03*** 27.90
Age of trade ﬁle in months 0.09*** 93.01
Panel B: Summary Statistics
Criteria Estimate
Akiake information criteria 1,679.57
2 log likelihood 1,657.57
Concordance (%) 91.4
Panel C: Custom Score Model Outcomes
Income Class Approved % Approved Denied % Denied Total
LMI 884 52.06a 814 47.94a 1,698
Upper income 436 76.76a 132 23.24a 568
Total 1,320 58.25 946 41.75 2,266
Notes: Custom credit score model employing a logistic regression analysis and the individual
scorecard attribute points on the full sample of 2,266 unsecured, home improvement applications. The
model in Panel A includes the following factors: time at current address, total trade lines, ﬁnance
company inquiries, overall inquiries, no. times 30-60 days late, applicant income, trade lines opened
in 1 year, revolving credit limit, number of satisfactory credits, age in months of trade ﬁle. Panel B
contains the summary statistics for the model, while Panel C contains a 2x2 matrix of judgmental
outcomes by income class, using the denial rate of 41.70% as the cutoff for determining approval or
denial; denial rate disparity 24.70%. The row percentages appear to the right of each cell. The
cumulative counts for each row appear as the right-most ﬁgures, while the cumulative counts for each
column appear in the bottom row.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
aThe Chi-square statistic for the difference in the two proportions across groups is 123.129 and
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Exhibit 9  22 Matrix of Actual Outcomes by Income Class
Income Class Approved % Approved Denied % Denied Total
LMI 242 76.34 75 23.66 317
Upper income 99 77.95 28 22.05 127
Total 341 76.80 103 23.20 444
Notes: 2x2 Matrix of actual outcomes by income class for those 444 applicants in the marginal
region. The row percentages appear to the right of each cell. The cumulative counts for each row
appear as the right-most ﬁgures, and the cumulative counts for each column appear in the bottom
row. Denial rate disparity is 1.61%








Credit-bureau score 677.4 655.1 3.9*** 2.1***
Custom credit score 204.6 206.5 3.1*** 1.9***
Custom Score Factors
Time at current address (months) 206.6 77.6 8.0*** 4.1***
No. of bank trade lines 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.0
No. of ﬁnance company inquiries 0.6 1.2 4.7*** 2.0***
No. of overall inquiries 2.1 2.8 4.2*** 2.2***
No. of times 30-60 days late 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.7
Applicant income (monthly) $2,019 $6,431 16.5*** 9.5***
No. of trade lines opened in 1 year 1.6 2.9 5.4*** 2.1***
Revolving credit limit $17,129 $27,164 4.9*** 2.4***
No. of satisfactory trade lines 11.9 18.4 6.6*** 2.6***
Age of trade ﬁle in months 203.9 171.1 2.2** 2.0***
Notes: Panel statistics for differences between low- to moderate-income and upper-income groups,
using the 444 marginal applicants. The table contains the averages for the LMI group and the upper-
income group, plus the Wilcoxon 2-sample test for differences across income groups and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distributional differences across income groups. The 1996 HUD median
income for the applicants MSA was used to create the bifurcation.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.The Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  145
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Exhibit 10 also provides the difference of means tests and distributional
comparisons for the individual custom scorecard attributes by income grouping.
Of these differences, marginal LMI applicants actually fare better than upper-
income applicants on a few of the metrics, including time at current address,
number of credit inquiries, number of credit derogatories and age of the trade ﬁle
in months.
The same machine-replicated judgmental underwriting model constructed for the
overall sample in Exhibit 7 is applied to the sub-population of marginal applicants
(see Exhibit 11). Panel A of Exhibit 11 contains the information on parameter
estimates and signiﬁcance for this subsample. These variables display different
strengths and signiﬁcance levels when compared with the same coefﬁcients and
tests for the full sample. For example, the number of minor derogatory credits is
not a signiﬁcant determinant of credit denial for these marginal applicants, while
the credit bureau score and the existence of a prior relationship with the lender
remain signiﬁcant. Panel B contains the summary statistics from the logistic
regression, revealing a concordance of 70.6% for this model.
Using the lender’s cutoff of 23.4% for the entire marginal sample, each of the
applicants is classiﬁed as either an approval or a denial in Panel C of Exhibit 11.
Of the 317 LMI applicants, 63 are denied using this rule, resulting in a denial
rate of 19.9%. Forty-one of the 127 upper-income applicants are denied using this
rule, resulting in a denial rate of 32.3%. The stated disparity is 12.4% in favor of
LMI applicants, and is statistically signiﬁcant.
Exhibit 12 shows the results for the ten-factor custom score model for the marginal
sample. Here the disparity remains in favor of LMI applicants, but the size of the
disparity is reduced by more than 60% to 4.7%. The LMI denial rate increases to
22.1% from 19.9% in the custom model, while the upper-income denial rate
decreases to 26.8% from 32.3%. This result provides further support for the null
hypothesis that judgmental systems result in lower denial disparity between low-
income and upper-income applicants compared to custom systems.
Exhibit 13 shows the outcomes for a seven-factor custom model that eliminates
the three types of variables argued by credit-scoring detractors as likely to result
in disparate impact. These variables include Applicant income, the number of
ﬁnance company inquiries and the highest revolving credit limit. Detractors have
argued that income and credit limits are not robust predictors of creditworthiness
and therefore should be scaled in a manner that better reﬂects the borrower’s
ability to pay, such as the debt-to-income ratio and the current debt-to-credit limit.
Finally, given that low-income and minority applicants are more likely to use
nontraditional ﬁnancial providers (e.g., ﬁnance companies), the inclusion of the
number of ﬁnance company inquiries has also been attacked as having the
potential to disparately impact these groups by creating abnormally high rates of
incidence.
The custom score factor model from Exhibit 12 is re-estimated in Exhibit 13 after
omitting these three variables. Panel A of Exhibit 13 contains the outcomes for146  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
Exhibit 11  Judgmental Underwriting Model Employing a Logistic Regression Analysis
for the Marginal Applicants
Panel A: Coefﬁcients
Variable Parameter Estimate Wald Chi-Square
Intercept 13.43*** 37.35
Credit bureau score 0.02*** 45.85
Major derogatories 0.16* 3.67
Minor derogatories 0.00 0.00
Prior relationship 0.87*** 8.89
Panel B: Summary Statistics
Criteria Estimate
Akiake information criteria 359.10
2 log likelihood 349.10
Concordance (%) 82.6
Panel C: Judgmental Model Outcomes
Income Class Approved % Approved Denied % Denied Total
LMI 254 80.13a 63 19.87a 317
Upper income 86 67.72a 41 32.28a 127
Total 340 76.58 104 23.42 444
Notes: Judgmental underwriting model employing a logistic regression analysis for the 444 marginal
applicants for unsecured, home improvement applications. The model in Panel A includes the
following factors: credit bureau score, major derogatories, minor derogatories and whether there was
a prior satisfactory relationship with the lender. Panel B contains the summary statistics for the model.
Panel C contains a 2x2 matrix of ex-post judgmental outcomes for the full sample of applicants by
income class, using the weights derived from the judgmental model in Panel A and the denial rate of
23.4% as the cutoff for determining approval or denial; denial rate disparity (LMI vs. high) is 12.41%.
The row percentages appear to the right of each cell. The cumulative counts for each row appear as
the right-most ﬁgures, while the cumulative counts for each column appear in the bottom row.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
aThe Chi-square statistic for the difference in the two proportions across groups is 5.017 and
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.The Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  147
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Exhibit 12  Custom Credit Score Model Employing a Logistic Regression Analysis
Panel A: Coefﬁcients
Variable Parameter Estimate Wald Chi-Square
Intercept 22.96*** 25.61
No. of inquiries 0.15*** 25.01
Time at current address 0.03 0.08
No. of ﬁnance company Inquiries 0.12*** 19.16
Applicant income 0.09*** 16.71
No. of satisfactory trade lines 0.11*** 18.88
No. times 30-60 days late 0.33*** 19.88
Revolving credit limit 0.10*** 15.01
No. of bank trade lines 0.37*** 7.72
No. of Trade lines opened in last year 0.09*** 13.68
Age of trade ﬁle in months 0.13*** 19.69
Panel B: Summary Statistics
Criteria Estimate
Akiake information criteria 436.69
2 log likelihood 414.69
Concordance (%) 74.90
Panel C: Judgmental Model Outcomes
Income Class Approved % Approved Denied % Denied Total
LMI 247 77.92a 70 22.08a 317
Upper income 93 73.23a 34 26.77a 568
Total 340 76.58 104 23.42 444
Notes: Custom credit score model employing a logistic regression analysis and the individual
scorecard attribute points for the 444 marginal applicants for unsecured, home improvement
applications. The model in Panel A includes the following factors: time at current address, total trade
lines, ﬁnance company inquiries, overall inquiries, no. times 30-60 days late, Applicant income, trade
lines opened in 1 year, revolving credit limit, number of satisfactory credits, age in months of trade
ﬁle. Panel B contains the summary statistics for the model. Panel C contains a 2x2 matrix of outcomes
by income class, using the denial rate of 23.4% as the cutoff for determining approval or denial;
denial rate disparity is -4.69%. The row percentages appear to the right of each cell. The cumulative
counts for each row appear as the right-most ﬁgures, and the cumulative counts for each column
appear in the bottom row.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
aThe Chi-square statistic for the difference in the two proportions across groups is 123.129 and
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Exhibit 13  Seven-Factor Custom Credit Score Model Employing a Logistic Regression Analysis
Panel A: Full Sample Outcomes
Income Class Approved % Approved Denied % Denied Total
LMI 931 54.83a 767 45.17a 1,698
Upper income 393 69.19a 175 30.81a 568
Total 1,324 58.43 942 41.57 2,266
Panel B: Full Sample Summary Statistics
Criteria Estimate
Akiake information criteria 1,855.71
2 log likelihood 1,839.71
Concordance (%) 89.0
Panel C: Marginal Sample Outcomes
Income Class Approved % Approved Denied % Denied Total
LMI 253 79.81a 64 20.19a 317
Upper income 88 69.29a 39 30.71a 568
Total 341 76.80 103 23.20 444
Panel D: Marginal Sample Summary Statistics
Criteria Estimate
Akieke information criteria 402.22
2 log likelihood 386.22
Concordance (%) 76.8
Notes: Seven-factor custom credit score model employing a logistic regression analysis and the
individual scorecard attribute points. Panel A contains outcomes for the full sample of 2,266
unsecured, home improvement applications, while Panel B contains summary statistics for this model;
denial rate disparity in the full samples is 14.36%. Panels C and D contain outcomes for the 444
marginal applicants and summary statistics, respectively; the denial rate disparity in the marginal
sample is -10.52%. The model for both samples includes the following factors: time at current
address, total trade lines, overall inquiries, no. times 30-60 days late, trade lines opened in 1 year,
number of satisfactory credits, age in months of trade ﬁle. Outcomes are shown by income class,
using the denial rates of 41.7% for the full sample and 23.4% for the marginal sample as the cutoffs
for determining approval or denial. The row percentages appear to the right of each cell. The
cumulative counts for each row appear as the right-most ﬁgures, and the cumulative counts for each
column appear in the bottom row.The Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  149
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the full sample of credit applicants, while Panel C contains the outcomes for the
marginal group. For both samples, the seven-factor model results in signiﬁcantly
lower disparities than those derived from the full ten-factor custom model,
conﬁrming the hypothesis that the use of these three excluded variables increase
the likelihood of denial for LMI applicants. For example, the full sample disparity
of 14.4% in the seven-factor model compares with a denial disparity of 24.7%
from application of the ten-factor model. Similarly, the marginal group disparity
is 10.5% in favor of LMI applicants in the seven-factor model, which is more
than twice the 4.7% favorable disparity of the ten-factor model. When comparing
these custom model disparities with the outcomes of the judgmental model in both
the full sample and the marginal sample, however, the judgmental results are still
more favorable to LMI applicants.
 Conclusion
As a result of the underwriting evolution toward the use of credit scoring in
mortgage lending, scoring is at the forefront of the policy debate surrounding fair
lending and potential disparate impact. Using 1996 loan application data on home
improvement loans from a large commercial bank, a framework is developed to
examine whether this system of credit scoring leads to more signiﬁcant denial
disparities between LMI applicants versus upper-income applicants when
compared with disparities observed from a judgmental underwriting approach.
Custom credit scoring systems are hypothesized to result in larger disparities for
LMI applicants, since these models neglect compensating or nontraditional credit
factors that are more common for LMI applicants. The ﬁndings conﬁrm this
hypothesis. For example, the results from the logistic regression models of denial
for the entire sample indicate LMI applicants fare signiﬁcantly worse in a
customized scoring environment as compared to a machine-replicated judgmental
regression model. When restricting the sample to marginal applicants with credit
scores around the denial cutoff level, the LMI applicants fare better in the
judgmental system over the custom credit score system.
These ﬁndings are important for the current policy debate over the impact of credit
scoring on LMI applicants. Proponents of credit scoring technology point out that
scoring improves the objectivity of the loan decision and lowers the overall cost
and time required to underwrite loans. Scoring detractors, however, are concerned
that these models lack sufﬁcient ﬂexibility and often omit information important
to the credit proﬁle of LMI and minority applicants. The ﬁndings lend support to
the latter argument. In sum, use of a custom credit score as the sole criteria in
underwriting home improvement loan applications results in larger denial
disparities between LMI versus upper-income applicants, ceteris paribus.
Finally, the results have important implications for bank supervision. Currently,
bank supervisors, ﬁnancial regulators and researchers focus their fair lending
concern on dealing with disparate treatment. The results suggest that the next150  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
generation of fair lending research, however, should begin to address issues related
to the potential disparate impact issues of credit scoring. This need is especially
high for internally developed scoring models that have not been subject to much
external scrutiny.
Although this study focuses on the implementation of a single credit scoring model
and the resulting underwriting disparities, future research must extend these results
with loan performance data. Such research would determine if the inclusion of
potentially discriminatory variables resulted from business necessity, in that these
variables signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the likelihood of default or default loss. If the
potentially discriminatory variable(s) shows a strong relation to delinquency or
default, research should assess the adequacy of alternative credit scoring variables
that have a smaller adverse impact on certain segments of the population while
maintaining or improving the predictiveness of delinquency or default.
 Endnotes
1 See Lewis (1994) for a history of credit scoring models. More recently, Mays (2001)
examines development, validation and implementation issues related to scoring that
includes a section on generic and customized models.
2 Various statistical methods are employed in scoring systems, including linear
programming, neural networks, logit analysis and discriminant analysis. The statistical
methodology employed depends on the expertise of the scorecard developer.
3 For an excellent review of the adoption of credit scoring in the mortgage lending
industry, see Straka (2001).
4 Fair Isaac, one of the primary developers of scoring models employed by banks,
estimates that when a bank changes from a judgmental to a scoring system they have a
20%–30% increase in the number of applicants accepted with no increase in the loss
rate. This is in addition to the reduction in processing costs and faster turnaround time.
5 Traditional consumers include upper income individuals with fairly extensive and long
lasting credit histories.
6 Banks and the credit bureaus do not collect or employ nontraditional forms of credit
worthiness, such as information on payment history of utility bills and rent payments
in their scoring models. Thus, it is argued by detractors of credit scoring that these
models may not gauge adequately the true risk of this segment of the population.
7 In recent years, these issues have been compounded by the fact that some sub-prime
lenders, that typically serve nontraditional groups, have neglected to report positive
information on payment histories to credit bureaus to keep these proﬁtable, but ‘‘high’’
risk, customers captive. See Credit Bureaus Move Against Lenders that Withhold
Information, American Banker December 30, 1999.
8 One of the motivations for adopting scoring systems is to reduce the likelihood of
disparate treatment. The cultural afﬁnity hypothesis suggests that marginal applicants
may be more stringently evaluated if their background differs from that of the
underwriter (Hunter and Walker, 1996). This occurs in a judgmental system if the
‘‘judgment’’ is not applied uniformly across protected classes. Discretion in overriding
a credit scored outcome, however, when based on additional qualitative information, alsoThe Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process  151
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offers the prospect for improving the likelihood of repayment. This augmented
information set will be especially important for applicants who have positive attributes
not captured by the scoring model.
9 Given that the authors do not possess loan performance data for the sample, an
assessment of whether the inclusion of these variables results from ‘‘business necessity’’
cannot be made.
10 This study is solely concerned with the inﬂuence of scoring on the approval/denial
decision. Scoring type models are used by banks for various other functions including
increasing or decreasing credit lines or loan rates and in the loan monitoring process.
11 Banks typically use small business scoring systems in this manner.
12 Banks typically use home improvement scoring systems in this manner.
13 If banks implementing scoring models permit ‘‘overrides’’ of decisions, however, then
it is still possible for disparate treatment issues to arise.
14 Religion, national origin, sex, marital status and receipt of public assistance are also
prohibited as a basis for lending decisions under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
15 If the bank does not have historical performance data to build a customized model, the
developers can pull data from one of the credit bureaus using criteria that will match
the overall demographics of the bank’s applicant pool.
16 In fact, no single generic ‘‘bureau’’ model scores all applicants. The credit depositories
have approximately ﬁfteen bureau models for different segments of the population. For
example, there is a thick ﬁle sub-population, a thin ﬁle sub-population and a highly
delinquent sub-population. The scores of each of these cards are risk adjusted so they
have the same odds of being ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad.’’
17 Van Order and Zorn (2000) examine mortgage loan default and loss rates by income
levels and ﬁnd that lower income neighborhoods experience somewhat higher loss and
default rates. Mills and Lubuele (1994), using a limited data set, conclude that LMI
mortgages perform better than their high income counterparts. Both of these studies,
however, do not control for applicant credit history.
18 While low-income applicants are not a protected class under Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act, the duties of a ﬁnancial institution in supporting the broader
community—including low and moderate income applicants—are covered under the
1977 Community Reinvestment Act and Regulation B, which implements the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). Community activist groups frequently cite alleged CRA
violations in protests of merger applications by ﬁnancial institutions. The authors also
conducted an analysis of disparities by applicant race. The income results are far stronger
and suggest more signiﬁcant disparities in credit-scoring than the race-based analysis
would indicate.
19 The median MSA income is not reported to protect the identity of the lender.
20 The data represent applications in a large urban geography with a high proportion of
LMI applicants.
21 Bureau scores can range anywhere from 400 to more than 800, while the custom card
under investigation is scaled in a different manner and ranges from 50 to 276.
22 The focus of fair lending exams at commercial banks typically analyze disparate
treatment issues with very little focus on disparate impact.
23 Detractors of scoring models have argued for the use of debt-to-income, rather than
income, as a measure of ability to pay. Separately, other detractors have argued that both152  Collins, Harvey and Nigro
ﬁnance company inquiries and income should not be used in models due to their high
correlation with applicant race.
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